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Rutherford and Adair: Battle of Passchendaele

The Battle of Passchendaele

The experiences of
Lieutenant Tom Rutherford, 4th
Battalion, Canadian Mounted Rifles
Introduction
by Jason Adair

F

or a man who experienced many battles,
26 October 1917 was a pivotal day for
Lieutenant Tom Rutherford. Destined to have
a long and distinguished career, his experience
that day, in many ways, would shape his
military character and strengthen his resolve
in defeating the German enemy.

Photo by William Rider-Rider, NAC PA2165

Lieutenant Tom Rutherford, from Owen
Sound, Ontario, was a platoon commander in
“D” Company of the 4th Battalion, Canadian
Mounted Rifles. Rutherford joined the 31st
Grey Regiment in 1912, was a member of the
147th Grey Battalion and later the 8th Reserve
Battalion, joining the 4th CMR in April 1917.
The year 1917 brought a series of successes
for the Canadian Corps beginning with Vimy
Ridge in April and ending with Hill 70 in
August. In general, these victories seemed to
be the product of unprecedented planning and
preparation that would become the hallmark
of Canadian operations during the war. Using
careful staff planning as the template for
success, the Canadians prepared for the attack
on Passchendaele. From the beginning of the
planning process, it was evident that this proven
template of meticulous preparation would be
difficult to apply. General Currie was concerned
about the condition of the battlefield, which had
seen the wettest summer in 30 years and three
years of continuous shellfire. This had greatly
Opposite: A lone Canadian soldier walks across the
desolation of the Passchendaele battlefield, November
1917.

altered the water table causing a morass of
mud. In fact, nearly half of the battlefield was
covered in water.1 These conditions created
problems in attack preparations including the
inability to access ample artillery support and
the sheer difficulty of moving other needed
supplies to forward areas. Furthermore,
German defenders had increased the depth of
their defences trading the trench for the pillbox
and also used a series of positions in forward
areas designed to break up attacks before
assaulting forces could overwhelm the main
defensive area.2 Despite these conditions and
their resultant problems the Canadian Corps
was poised for attack.
The Canadian Corps attacks in the late
fall of 1917 toward the Belgian village of
Passchendaele represented the last phase of
the British attempt to break out of the Ypres
Salient and seize the German-held channel
ports. The overall offensive commenced 31
July 1917 and included British, French, New
Zealand, Australian and Canadian troops. It
was marred by unachievable objectives and
deplorable terrain conditions.3
Until October 1917, the Canadian role in the
offensive was limited but as the British faltered
the Canadian Corps was reassigned to the
British 2nd Army and given the task of capturing
the village of Passchendaele. LieutenantGeneral Arthur Currie was not impressed at
the prospect of committing his Corps to an
offensive that had lost its momentum and
seemed of little value to the improvement of the
strategic situation.4 Nevertheless, as early as
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casualties between 26 and 28 October. With only
seven battalions of six hundred men involved in
the attack, the casualties were extremely high.6

13 October preparations began for an operation
that sought to give indirect assistance to the
pending French attack in Champagne, to keep
the enemy occupied during preparations for
the planned attack at Cambrai, and to adopt a
suitable defensive posture for the winter atop
the 165-foot high Passchendaele ridge.5

One of the seven battalions attacking on 26
October was the 4th CMR, from Central Ontario.
It was on the extreme left of the Canadian
Corps front and was given the unenviable task
of attacking through a bog to the intermediate
objective of Wolf Copse and on to the final
objective of the Woodland Plantation, a distance
of 600 metres along a two company frontage
(“C” Company left, “B” Company right). October
26th was described as the “bloodiest day in the
battalion’s history” but one that would also see
a young soldier inspire his battalion through a
single-handed assault on a German pillbox. For
this courageous act, Private Tom Holmes, from
Owen Sound, was awarded the Victoria Cross.

The Canadian Corps attacked at 0540 hours on
26 October. The assault was preceded by four
days of artillery bombardment. The Canadians
attacked along a two-division front divided
by the Ravebeek swamp. The 3rd Canadian
Division was on the left with the 8th Brigade
deploying a single battalion, the 4th Canadian
Mounted Rifles (4th CMR), and the 9th Brigade
deploying two battalions, the 43rd and the 58th.
The 4th Canadian Division was on the right and
was more constrained in terms of frontage. This
meant it could only use one battalion, the 46th,
in the initial assault. Although the Canadian
Corps did not succeed in achieving all of its
objectives, the British High Command were
pleased and determined that the Canadian
gains would enhance the effectiveness of
future attacks. The Canadians suffered 2,481
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What follows is Rutherford’s recollection of the
Battle of Passchendaele. Written in the late
1920s, this account provides detailed insights
into the battle through the eyes of a young
officer and highlights the challenges facing the
Canadian infantryman at Passchendaele.
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Lieutenant
Rutherford’s
account

our Battalion front. I, for instance, saw nothing
of the recorded incident of the truce to pick up
wounded.
After the Hill 70 offensive north of Lens in July
and August 1917, the Canadian Corps was pulled
out of the front line into the back areas to practice
going over the tapes, as was done before Vimy,
for an Offensive that was to take place on the
Merrycourt front south of Lens to complement
the successful Hill 70 show to the north, and
thus leave the important coal mines and city in
a salient that could be pinched off later. All of a
sudden, after we had practised for a couple of
weeks, plans were changed and the entire Corps
was moved north into billets in the flat open
country around Poperinge, west of Ypres.

J

Photo supplied by Jason Adair

ust my own personal experience and
observations. No one saw the whole Battle
and most records written by those who were
not there have distorted it in many ways. For
instance, few who have read accounts of the Battle
would believe that there were only two pillboxes
each on the 4th CMR front and on that of the
43rd Battalion. There was, however, a machinegun post in a trench on our left Company front.
I can vouch for this as I was back and went over
the ground carefully twice, once about eight days
after the Battle and once in February 1918 just
before we left for home. Quite a few of the men
in the left sector Companies went forward of the
objective and, finding nothing, came back and
dug in on the objective; in doing so they had to
take out a machine-gun position opposite and
to the left of the pillbox close to the centre of

On our arrival here we learned that we were
shortly to go in to relieve the Anzacs (the name
given to the Australian-New Zealand Corps) who,
with the British, had been struggling to expand the
Ypres salient farther to the east. I well remember
the day our Company Commander, Captain Bill
Muirhead, and the other Company Commanders
were taken up to look over the place where the
Regiment was to attack and what he told us, when
he came back, of the conditions we would be up
against. He was a good and brave Officer, but was
far from pleased with the prospect of taking his
Company into the morass he had seen which was
protected by several German concrete pillboxes
instead of underground dugouts such as we had
been accustomed to seeing farther south in the
chalk soils of Vimy and Hill 70.
The day that we were to leave soon arrived. We
took a train as far as Ypres, where we detrained
and marched through the battered, uninhabited
city with its one-time beautiful Cathedral and
Cloth Hall. The Germans, probably seeing our
movement from the air, were shelling the city
with naval guns which had a very long range.
However, we had no casualties that I remember.
Just at dusk we arrived in the St. Jean area.
Some, I recall, went into a tunnel but most of the
Battalion were in tents which kept us out the rain
but were no protection when the German planes
came over at night and pulled their tailboards,
showering the area with pineapple bombs.
On October 23 we moved forward to a bit of
Lieutenant Tom Rutherford, photographed in early 1916,
wearing the insignia of the 147th Grey Battalion. This
battalion was broken up to reinforce battalions already
in France.
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Lieutenant Tom Rutherford (standing on right) poses for a photograph with a group of 4 CMR officers from Owen Sound.

higher ground called Abraham Heights where
we spent the night in such dry shell-holes as we
could find; late the next day, the 24th, we moved
forward to the position from which we were to
attack on the 26th. As we were leaving Abraham
Heights to go up to our jumping-off trench we
lost two Officers, Lieutenant Jack Campbell and
Captain Johnny Woods, both killed with the same
shell. They were both outstanding Officers whom
the Battalion could ill afford to lose. Because what
little there was in the way of a track was being
shelled, we were well spread out; some Platoons
got lost and didn’t get in until late the following
morning.
The trench we occupied was hardly worthy of
the name – just a broken down ditch with up to
six inches of water in parts of it. However, on the
25th the sun came out and it was a reasonably
warm day. We were able to dry our wet clothes,
and those of us who were to lead the operations
at the 0540 zero hour the next morning had
a chance to get our Orders and look over the
ground in front of us which we were to cross
next morning. We were each given a small sketchmap of our own area which had little on it except
our position, our objective, and the boundaries
between the 4th CMR and the Battalions on our

right and left, together with the inter-Company
boundary. The 4th CMR were on the left of the
Corps, with, I think, the Artist Rifles of the British
Naval Division on our left, and the 43rd Canadian
Infantry Battalion on our right.
The Battalion front was only a little over a quarterof-a-mile wide and little more from our jumpingoff trench to our objective, and practically level
but rising slightly towards our objective. It was
divided down the centre into two Company fronts;
on the right “D” Company with “A” Company in
support, and on the left “C” Company was in
front with “B” Company in support. One Platoon
of each of the front Companies was to patrol
the front up to the barrage line from 12 o’clock
until just before zero hour, by which time they
were to be well forward close to the barrage line
in packets of sections. My Platoon had this job
on the right Company front, and Jaffray Eaton’s
Platoon from “C” Company had the same job on
the left.
During the afternoon of the 25th the weather was
clear and sunny, and I spent a lot of time going
from one end of our Company front to the other
with a pair of binoculars in an effort to familiarize
myself with the ground ahead. The right flank
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of our Company was in a little wood relatively
much smaller than the Wolf Copse as it is called
on the sketch-map in the 4th CMR History. It was
elm trees about a foot through and, at that time
of year, bare of leaves. In the centre of this wood
and on the enemy side stood the ruins of a small
house, just one wall about three or four feet high.
It was called “Wolf Farm.” Beyond Wolf Farm and
on the edge of the wood was what appeared to
be an enemy pillbox covered on top and in front
with broken bricks, apparently from Wolf Farm
as the loose bricks had been gathered up around
that area. Beyond this and about 300 yards to
the right (well over on the 43rd Battalion front)
and on the end of a small spur that dominated
the whole area, was another very obvious pillbox.
Farther back but still well over on the 43rd
front and about in line with our given objective,
was what appeared to be another pillbox, also
covered in front and on top with what appeared
to be broken bricks. Beyond that, the ground
apparently fell away somewhat as I could not see
it except over on the right where it was higher.
However, I could see the tops of the trees in what

was marked on our sketch-map as “Woodland
Plantation.”
On the left of the Company front there was
a row of trees about 50 yards in front of our
position, planted along what apparently had
been a farm road going from Wollemolen over to
Wolf Farm; the ground here was very low, with
large shell-holes full of water with some areas
completely flooded. Right on our boundary with
“C” Company and about 200 yards from our
trench was another pillbox on somewhat higher
ground than where I was standing. On this flank
I met my long-time friend who had just joined
the Battalion – Jaffray Eaton (the only son of
a widowed mother) who had been Second-inCommand of our Grey County Battalion and
had reverted from Major to get to France. His
task on the left forward Company front was the
same as mine on the right; that is to say, to patrol
the Company front after midnight to make sure
that no enemy was lurking close by and then to
deploy his sections close to the barrage line just
before zero hour.
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From where we stood we could see his Company
front and although we could not detect any
pillboxes we definitely suspected that some were
there. So we agreed that I would come to the left
flank with one of my sections and endeavour to
get to the pillbox that appeared to be about on
the line which divided the Company fronts, as
there seemed to be less water on my side than
on his although both were badly flooded. We
agreed to meet on that flank just before zero
hour to exchange any further information we
had gathered.

with where we were standing, making the typical
little cloud of black smoke. Within half-a-minute
there was another one right over our heads, and
a piece of shrapnel went in behind Robson’s gas
respirator and his chest and grazed his ribs. He
bled rather badly and also coughed up blood, but
a volunteer stretcher party soon had him on the
way to “Crown Prince’s Farm,” which was a large
pillbox that served as Battalion Headquarters and
a Dressing Station. These were the only shells
that day. I guess the Germans were also enjoying
the bright sunshine.

I then went back to the centre of our Company
front and gave Captain Muirhead the information
I had. Lieutenant Arthur Deacon and Lieutenant
“Dinty” Moore were with him. The Headquarters
was a projection cut in the side of the trench and
covered with some old boards, the ceiling was
only about four feet high. The sun was shining
and it was a chance to get dry (except for wet
feet) so I went out and stood with my back to
the side of the trench and talked for a couple
of hours to one of my men – Robson by name –
who happened to be from Owen Sound. There
had been no shelling all morning but all at once
a Wooly Bear burst in the air in a direct line

Then night closed in and with a couple of hunks
of bread in my stomach but no water, I lay
down and slept, to be wakened at midnight to
do my patrol of the area in front of the trench,
accompanied by two of my own men. We spent
most of the time at Wolf Farm as we could stand
on the floor and look out over the low wall which
still stood. Funnily enough, I was told after the
battle that when the Company went past in the
morning two German soldiers came out of the
cellar; one shot at Lieutenant Moore, wounding
him in the head. They must have been lying low
in there while we stood on the floor above them.
The rest of my Platoon had been assigned to their

A panorama of the Passchendaele battlefield as it appeared in November 1917,
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forward positions the afternoon before and would
take them up just before zero hour so that they
might move close under the barrage.
About half an hour before zero hour I returned
with my patrol to Company Headquarters to get
another hunk of bread and to fill our water bottles
as we expected the water would have arrived
by then. But no water had come. The Battalion
went over without any – “Water, water everywhere
but not a drop to drink.” Having been crawling
around in unspeakable filth for much of the past
four hours, when handed a loaf of bread I reached
forward and wrenched a piece off with my teeth so
as not to foul the rest of it. Right there I was read
a lecture on manners – and a serious one, too – by
Lieutenant Arthur Deacon, a Bank Manager from
Stratford and 20 years older than I. I resented
it at the time because had he known what I had
been crawling over during the night, I think he
would have realized that my approach was the
more sanitary. However, before many hours had
passed I was to find out that underneath his
formal manner lay the heart of one of the bravest
men I have ever known.

Photo by William
Rider-Rider,
NAC PA 40139

About 0500 hours I went back with a section of
four men to the left of the Company front where I
had arranged to meet Jaffray Eaton. It was almost
time to move out into our forward positions so,

having confirmed what we had decided the day
before, we shook hands and each, with our little
sections of four men, went his separate way. We
were no sooner there than a flash of light in the
semi-darkness behind told us that our shells
were coming, so we laid low in shell-holes lest
any fall short. The first rounds came in almost a
straight line right in front of us, but the second
rounds were not so good and many fell short as
the guns had very little platform in the mud a
mile behind. I think probably it was one of these
that got Jaffray Eaton as I found his bones when
I visited Passchendaele 16 months later before we
left Belgium to come home to Canada. Someone
had apparently covered him up with earth where
he fell and put up a little picket cross about a
foot high, but the rains had washed his skull
clean and while I could find no identity disk I
knew it was Jaffray by his teeth which were quite
distinctive. I believe there were many more killed
the same way that morning.
When the barrage lifted we went forward in a
drizzle of rain, and in the grey dawn of a Flanders
morning we were soon up to our knees in water
and tangled in wire which was underneath the
water and fastened to the row of trees I mentioned
earlier. Apparently Captain Muirhead could see
me from the trench and sent a messenger to tell
me I must get on. By this time I had disentangled
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myself from the wire but hadn’t gotten through it
and backed up, looking for a better place to get
ahead. I spied a tree which a shell had hit about
four feet from the ground; it had fallen towards
us, still clinging to the stump with bent slivers.
I had by now lost three of my four men; only my
runner, Tommy Brooks, was with me. I climbed
onto the sloping tree trunk and ran up it. Looking
down I saw nothing but water. Judging that it
wouldn’t be too deep I jumped and, of course,
fell and was completely under water as it was, I
would say, almost three feet deep. I got up and
struggled towards the other side, hearing Tommy
land in the water behind me.
With all my equipment and probably 50 pounds
of water soaked into my clothing, haversack
and gas respirator, I was unable to climb out.
Under my tunic I was wearing a heavy khaki
sweater that I bought in Owen Sound before I
left home, so while still in the water I transferred
my Mills bomb from my right jacket-pocket to

the right pocket of my sweater and my revolver
ammunition to my left sweater-pocket, took my
revolver out of its holster which was attached
to the equipment but also to a lanyard around
my neck, unbuckled my equipment belt and
unbuttoned my tunic. I then let the whole lot –
map case, respirator, wire cutters, entrenching
tool and all – slide back into the water. So with
my revolver in my hand and the bomb in my
sweater-pocket I was able to crawl out, soaking
wet. I looked back to give Tommy Brooks a hand,
but all I could see was his fair hair floating in
bloody water. I headed for the pillbox ahead,
catching up to a Sergeant from “C” Company who
was heading for the same place.
The barrage had just lifted. We saw no Germans
around nor were we shot at. It was one of those
pillboxes with a shallow trench close behind it
running out to both left and right, with a wooden
lean-to covering the trench to keep out the rain.
The Sergeant – Sergeant Nicholas of “C” Company
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– had his bomb ready in his hand and I motioned
to him to go in first. We both jumped into the
shallow trench and underneath the board cover
until we came to the opening, where he threw
the bomb in. Almost instantly, and before the
bomb had gone off, a big wild-eyed German
without weapons jumped out between us and,
in his fright, turned on me under the low roof;
he grabbed me by the head and started twisting
it. I had my revolver in his chest but he didn’t
let go and I was beginning to black out. Having
seen other Germans coming out and following
Nicholas out the other side I pulled on him and
in falling on top of me, he pushed me back to
the opening. So here was a sweater-clad figure
backing out from the lean-to to the pillbox, with
a dead German partly on top of him. Just then
an excited man arriving with some others from
“C” Company, was loading his rifle so he brought
the butt down on my head, but as the German
had pushed the rim of my steel hat up on edge I
was none the worse.

As we had to pass within 150 yards of the
pillbox on the spur, Archie and I never stopped
running because our only chance was to get by it
unnoticed and get to the other one just as soon as
the barrage lifted. I had no sensation of being shot
at directly up to this time and it is not difficult
to tell when you have a bullet pass close to your
ear. Since leaving the water-hole and our first
pillbox I had been able to keep on my feet and to
keep running, only stopping this once to size up
the situation and make up my mind as to what
I must do. Just as Archie and I got to about 50

NAC PA 2352

We were now up even with the other pillbox on
our front which was, I would say, 300 yards to
our right. Brandishing my revolver and pointing
to it I yelled, “Come on,” and started towards
it, never looking back. In travelling so light and
being able to run on the drier ground turned up
by our barrage, I made good time. When I arrived
at, say, 50 feet from the pillbox, I saw that it had
already been taken. Our men were not only in it
but also huddled around the back and side of it,
with a number apparently dead or wounded lying
behind and at the side of it. Looking beyond it
towards the 43rd front I could see the pillbox on
Bellevue Spur, with Germans standing up behind
it and firing with rifles at the 43rd – who were
Kilties – as they tried to stumble forward through
the mud. It was a terrible slaughter and I would
say that almost every shot got its man. When there
weren’t enough Highlanders in sight – some going
forward and some running back – the Germans
turned their rifles (I don’t remember a machine
gun firing) on our men around the captured
pillbox which I later learned had been taken by
Tommy Holmes, VC.

I saw my Company Commander and some of
my own Platoon and decided that as long as
there were enough of the 43rd in sight to keep
the Gemans busy, a few men could get up past
them to the pillbox behind, which was still under
our barrage, and so get at the men behind the
big pillbox on the spur from the rear. Although
neither pillbox was on our front, it looked like
the only way for others to get forward and there
was no time to lose as the barrage, which seemed
to be keeping the Germans in the pillbox, would
soon be lifting. Archie Smith, one of my own
Platoon, was at my side and, waving my revolver,
I pointed towards the pillbox beyond and to the
left of the one that was doing all the killing, and
yelled, “Come on.”

Private T.W. Holmes of the 4th Battalion, Canadian
Mounted Rifles, was awarded a Victoria Cross for his role
in knocking out a German pill box on 26 October 1917.

71
https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol13/iss4/6

10

Rutherford and Adair: Battle of Passchendaele

feet from the pillbox we were after, Archie spurted
forward and, dropping on his knee, raised his
rifle, pointing it at the corner of the pillbox but
before he could shoot, his rifle fell from his hand
and he slumped to the ground. I looked up but
could see no one.
In case someone was waiting around the corner,
I fired two shots which ricocheted off the corner
to scare whoever had fired. When I rounded the
corner no one was there (he must have been about
50 feet farther on in the sunken road which was
our final objective for the day) so I reached for
the bomb in my sweater-pocket. With my right
hand having transferred my revolver to my left,
I had made the mistake of not straightening the
pin. It took some little time to straighten it, during
which time I could have been shot, and, in the
meantime, someone appeared beside me in a
trench coat. Without looking up I handed him
my revolver still on its lanyard around my neck,
pulled the pin and threw the bomb in. Then I said,
“Is that thing ever going off” – four seconds is a
long time under such circumstances. I reached
for my revolver and just as the man handed it
back he was shot through the lower forearm. It
was Lieutenant Arthur Deacon (the one who had

read me the lecture on etiquette before dawn
that morning). Why the same German hadn’t got
me when I hesitated to draw the pin, I will never
know. He was very close, but I couldn’t see him.
Then, the Germans – 16 of them (one wounded
and one dead were left inside) – came tumbling
out with their hands up. Something, probably one
of our shells because the barrage had just passed,
hit the top of the pillbox and sent a shower of
bricks in all directions. I told Deacon, who was
bleeding badly and had the bone sticking out of
his arm, to take the prisoners “already running in
that direction with their hands up” back because
I had another job to do. He started out behind
them.
Then I started out to the left to see if I could find
some men for a covering party, and to get another
bomb and a rifle to try to take the big pillbox on
the 43rd front from behind. In doing this I was
shot at twice, probably by the same man who
got Archie Smith and Deacon, so I dropped to
the ground and from then on I rolled from shellhole to shell-hole towards a Canadian steel hat
I could see sticking out of a shell-hole. It was a
Corporal whom I did not recognize but told him

NAC PA 2210

Two Canadian soldiers stand on a captured German pillbox near Passchendaele, November 1917. It is likely this
pillbox is in the 4th Canadian Division sector on the right flank due to the railroad tracks in the background.
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Soldiers from the 16th Canadian Machine Gun Company holding the line in shell holes during the Battle of Passchendaele.

to see if he could find some more men and meet
me behind the pillbox I had just taken, but I never
saw him again. I then discarded my own steel hat
as I realized it was a give-away when hiding in
a shell-hole; of course my face – like the rest of
me – was plastered with mud.
Still rolling, I started back to a position behind
the pillbox to await the men who never came.
On the way I found my Company Commander
just dying in a shell-hole; he smiled at me and
was gone. He had a bird-cage with two carrier
pigeons. The next man I was to find was Deacon
who, instead of going back with the prisoners,
had stopped off, almost immediately after I had
sent him back, with one of his men who was
hiding in a shell-hole. The man shortly afterwards
had been shot through the head and was lying
across Deacon whose good arm was down in the
mud and the wounded arm on his chest. I rolled
the man’s body off him and up on the top of the
shell-hole behind me to act as a background and
got his bomb, put it in my pocket, and took his
rifle – the muzzle of which was jammed full of
earth. Thinking quickly, I took a round from the
chamber, put it in the muzzle and wiggled the
bullet loose and took it out, and put in a little mud
to hold the cordite, then fired the round which

cleared but did not burst the barrel, which often
happens when a loaded round is fired through
a plugged barrel.
No one had arrived to form a covering party to
help me get up to the big pillbox from the rear,
so I stayed where I was. I could see the Germans
standing up on something and firing at the
Highlanders, most of whom by now had started
to move back from shell-hole to shell-hole, but
very few who exposed themselves were not shot
down. My first shot was at the man on the end of
the pillbox next to me and, although only about
150 yards away, I missed him and he just turned
around and looked. It was a cold rainy morning
and by this the I had been soaking wet for at least
20 minutes and was still lying in water. I was
shaking like a leaf with cold and the excitement
of the battle, and was lying across Deacon. So I
made a little bed in the mud for my rifle to hold
it steady, and this time I brought the German
down, followed by his three mates near the other
end. No one came out to take their places and as
I could see about six inches of the entrance to the
pillbox above the intervening ground I kept on
firing, hoping even if I didn’t get anyone inside,
at least to keep them inside until someone came
up from the front.
73
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Shortly afterwards, Lieutenant Ray Warren and
four or five “A” Company men ran past towards
the pillbox we had taken; I called to them to come
and get Deacon but they went on in. However, it
wasn’t long until Warren and another man came
out and, by my shoving and their pulling, we got
Deacon on his feet. They went back in where it
was warm and where German food and water
were available. Quite some time afterwards I saw
men coming up who wore khaki trousers instead
of kilts like the 43rd; soon more and more came
up and went into the pillbox. At the time I did not
know who they were, but they were a Company
of the 52nd Battalion who were in support to the
43rd and who, when the firing that had killed
about half of the attacking force had stopped,
were able to approach and take the pillbox on the
spur which had been responsible, I would say, for
more than half of the men killed that day, both
in the 43rd and in our own Battalion on the left
of it. One man who is a good shot, armed with a
rifle and behind a concrete block in a situation
such as existed that day, is good for about two
men per minute so long as they are standing up
and exposed.
As soon as I was satisfied that the pillbox had
indeed fallen and that Canadians were now
in it, I got up and went into the pillbox with
Warren, Deacon and the others. It was a grand
and glorious feeling, even if my clothing and feet
were still soaking wet from my “morning bath”
and later lying in water for most of the morning.
I found that my bomb had killed one man in the
pillbox and badly wounded another. He received
the best of treatment from our men. There was
plenty of food and water, neither of which I had
seen very much of for 48 hours.
One of the men who came into the last pillbox
and whom I had to leave there, was Company
Sergeant-Major Dunlop with whom I had slept
in a shell-hole on “Abraham Heights” two nights
earlier, lying as close as we could to keep warm.
He had been shot in the stomach and thinking
that officers carried morphine, pleaded with me
to give him some. I never saw anyone suffer as
he did. The stretcher-bearers got him out but
not until after dark. Like so many others who
were wounded he died the next day. He was a
fine soldier.
Some time afterwards an officer and a group of
men from the 52nd joined us in the pillbox, and

Warren hastily scribbled a note saying that we
had made contact with the 52nd on the objective,
and sent it to Headquarters. However, he didn’t
introduce the no-rank-badges, sweater-clad
drowned rat huddled in a corner to keep warm,
as the man who had taken 16 prisoners out of
that pillbox on their front, and who had remained
outside, stopping the fire from around and over
the key pillbox – for the taking of which no less
than three Victoria Crosses were granted, two
to the 43rd and one to the 52nd, and no doubt
well earned.
My satisfaction came when General Lipsett said
of our Regiment, “At Passchendaele you made
the hole through which the gallant 52nd was
able to pass and capture Bellevue Spur.” After
Passchendaele I recommended Arthur Deacon
for the Military Cross, and Sergeant Nicholas for
the Distinguished Conduct Medal. I was sent on
a course where I was, I guess, supposed to learn
how to look after my equipment and clothing in
battle. Had I looked like an Officer or been laden
down with equipment and gone where I did, I
wouldn’t be here to tell this story. It was fighting
like a guerrilla that saved my life. I wasn’t drunk
– as the Colonel was told and, I am sure, believed.
I guess I was just crazy. I went in with a threeounce aluminum flask of rum in the hip pocket
of my trousers and, in spite of the cold which was
intense, in completely saturated clothes, forgot
it was there until I found it the next day when I
lay on it.
Well, we weren’t in the pillbox very long after the
52nd boys arrived to take over when, looking
through the door, I saw small groups of Germans
coming down the slope on our right. This looked
like preparation for a counterattack so I gathered
our men together, leaving Warren with the 52nd,
gathered up a bunch of German entrenching tools
(small spades), moved about 200 yards to the left
or to about the centre of our Company objective,
and started to dig in. The ground was drier here
and the soil about the color and consistency of
cheese. They began to shell us a bit, and I never
saw men disappear in the ground so fast. I had
to stop them because the trench was too narrow
to pass in and there were no bays or fire steps;
these had to be put in. The Germans continued
to trickle down the slope, and I sent a group out
to look for a Lewis gun and pans of ammunition,
and also bandoleers of ammunition from the
dead. They returned with one Lewis gun and two
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One of the Bellvue pillboxes, photographed in April or May 1919. The mud and water have given way to a rough
grass and weeds, but the ravaged trees and forlorn crosses still unmistakeably mark this as a battlefield.

pans and plenty of ammunition and, with our
rifles, we felt relatively safe.
As darkness descended and before the moon
cane out, I began to worry about a counterattack
and sent one man – Bruce Dunn of Owen Sound
– back to the two rear pillboxes to get, if he
could, an SOS flare so that we could call for our
own artillery on our SOS line which was just in
front of us. I waited quite a while but he didn’t
come back so I went myself to the pillbox that
Nicholas and I had taken early in the morning.
There were quite a number of our men in it and
I warned them of the need to keep watch in case
of a counterattack in the night. There were no
flares, so I told them to get some from Battalion
Headquarters and bring them up to me. Warren
was asleep but for some reason I couldn’t wake
him, so I went back because the moon had come
out from under the clouds and we could see in
front of us if anyone attacked. I also brought up
some more ammunition. When I went back to the
pillbox I went in the same side of the lean-to that
we had used in the morning and stepped right on
the back of the German I had shot. He made a
sound like a cough which gave me quite a start.
The men had left him there and were using the
entrance at the other end of the leanto.
Some time after, I do not remember how
long, a Company of the Reserve Battalion – I have
forgotten which of the CMRs it was – arrived to
relieve us in the front line. I sent my men back.
By this time most of them, like myself, were still
wet and very tired. I stayed on, keeping one man
who volunteered to stay with me – a chap by the

name of McArthur who once had a small sawmill
in Owen Sound and who now lives in Burlington
and comes to our 147th Battalion Reunions. After
staying for some time, he and I went over to the
pillbox that had been taken over by the 52nd to
get my revolver which I had left there, taking a
rifle instead. They were all in the pillbox and I
warned them of the possibility of a counterattack
and suggested that some should stay outside.
McArthur and I then walked over the
battlefield, reaching down and touching those we
saw on the ground to make sure that no wounded
and unconscious were among them. We then
went back to Battalion Headquarters, to which
I had sent the few men I had in the trench when
we were relieved. As soon as I went in, someone
gave me a cigarette tin of rum and tea – mostly
rum, I think, for it wasn’t more than a minute or
two, they said, until I fell over on the floor sound
asleep. There I lay for two hours, they said, with
people tramping over me. I remember wakening
with a start and saying, “Where are my men?”
They told me that when they reported in they had
been sent back to the trench we had jumped off
from in the morning. I said that I must get back
to them.
I couldn’t find McArthur who had come – with
me, and the Colonel said to an Officer who hadn’t
been in the battle but who was standing in the
corner, “You go up with Rutherford.” I knew the
Officer and would have preferred to go alone;
anyway, we started out and hadn’t gone far when
the Hun started to shell. The first one came rather
close and the Officer started to run in the other
75
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direction. I should have let him go, but I left the
track and followed him. When another shell
came he went in still another direction and took
to a shell-hole. I should have left him then, but
I pointed my rifle at him and told him to come
on with me. He came but by this time I was lost
myself and decided to stay where we were until
morning, when I knew I could locate the spot to
which we were heading by an old sniper post in
a tree in Wolf Copse. However, there was one of
our own machine guns firing on fixed lines not
far from us and the Officer (who has been dead
for many years) decided that he was going over
there. I told him to do so if he wanted to.
As soon as I could see the tree I was looking
for I got up. I saw the Officer coming back. He
said that the machine gun crew had a wire to
Brigade HQ, and he had sent a message that we
were lost and were waiting for daylight. What
he actually said, as I found out much later, was
that I had got him lost and threatened to shoot
him unless he went where I wanted him to go.
As soon as the shelling started I should have
left him to his own devices and kept to the path
instead of following him into the morass of shellholes, but I felt responsible for him because the
Colonel had sent him with me. But I would have
managed much better by myself and avoided the
Colonel’s wrath, which I am told was very obvious

when he got the message that his friend had sent
to Brigade HQ. Anyway, as soon as the Officer
joined me I pointed out where we were heading.
We were soon there, where we found what little
was still left of the Battalion.
That evening we were relieved and came out
to some Geman pillboxes behind the Battalion
Headquarters. There was one big pillbox and two
smaller ones, and the ground was full of pieces of
wire and dead bodies from the fighting during the
previous summer. I got the men all packed into
the big pillbox and one of the smaller ones; and
the second-in-command of our Company – who
had not been in the show but joined us as we
passed Battalion Headquarters – took the other
small pillbox. He had a flashlight and when we
went in we could see that there was about one to
two inches of water on the floor and a stretcher
in one corner which he looked at and, despite
the fact that he had slept the night before, said,
“I guess I am the senior.” He went over and lay
down while I found a place where the water
was shallowest. He was soon asleep but I was
shivering and knew that I couldn’t sleep. I got up
and went over to the pillbox where I had stowed
away most of the men. I felt around until I found
a little crack between two of the men (all of whom
were sleeping on their sides) and, wedging my
shoulder between two of the sleepers, gradually

NAC PA 2137

A Canadian 6-inch Howitzer at Passchendaele. The accuracy of the artillery was poor during this battle due
to the wet conditions on the battlefield which caused the guns to sink into the mud as they fired repeatedly.
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Soldiers from 4 CMR rest in a barn, October 1917.

I sat outside enjoying the sun. Looking over
at the other small pillbox, I saw one of our boys
– Barrett by name – from Owen Sound, sitting on
a pile of old boards taking off his boot and socks.
Just then a shell came over and exploded, having
first buried itself in the mud behind him. It lifted
him up but didn’t hurt him. Having seen me, he
started to run towards me. When he got there I
looked down at his feet; they were swollen and
white except where they were gashed by the wire
he had run through, and the dark unbleeding
proud flesh was sticking out. It was the first
pair of trench feet I had ever seen but that day,
as one man after another took off his boots, I
saw many more. My own feet were not too bad
because my boots, which were high-laced ones,
had been hurting the back tendons above the
heels and I had opened them up with my knife.
This, of course, let the water in but it also let it
out, and this I think helped. Barrett went to the
hospital and I don’t think ever came back; his
feet bothered him the rest of his life.
From here we moved back to the camp near
St. Jean and did working parties on the plank
road which became the main artery of supply
and approach to the front for the two succeeding
phases of the Passchendaele Battle six days
apart. Having been in the battle, I missed the
rather unpleasant assignments of these working
parties. On about the eighth day after our attack,
the Padre – Captain Davis – announced that he
was going back to the battlefield to collect what
he could from the pockets of those who had been
killed. The Colonel was letting him go alone and I
asked if I could go with him. He rather grudgingly
replied that I could, but that it wouldn’t count
as a working party and that I would have to take
mine when my turn came. The Padre, one of the
most fearless men I have ever known, was happy
to have me go with him, and we set out early one
morning with full water bottles and a fruit cake
from home in our pockets. It was a walk of about
six miles, largely on duckboards which are two
scantling side by side about two feet apart and
battens about two inches apart nailed between.
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worked my way in and fell asleep. In the morning,
probably well on to noon, not a soul had stirred.
They told me that someone came to the opening
and asked if anyone had seen Mr. Rutherford but
no one had and we slept on. When we wakened
I, being opposite the opening, had to get up first.

We got there before noon. The Padre had made
little bags from sandbags so that he could keep
separate what we found on each man, and these
went into two larger sandbags.
We worked the left sector first and as there
was some random shelling, we went into the
pillbox that Nicholas and I had taken the morning
of the battle; the dead German was still near
the end of the lean-to. We ate our fruit cake
and had a drink from our water bottles, having
first washed our hands with some of the water.
When we came out the sun was shining and the
buildings of Passchendaele were easily seen, and
I guess we were too because it wasn’t long until
the Hun started to shell us. Of course I ducked
for a shellhole when I heard one coming close,
but the Padre just looked at me and stood his
ground until I heard one coming which, from
the way he was bracketing us, should have been
dead on; I threw my arms around the Padre and
threw him down, luckily into a shell-hole, which
saved both of us because the shell buried itself
only feet away and showered us with earth when
it exploded. The Padre just got up and shook
himself as if nothing had happened.
77
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After a while the Hun, probably guessing
what we were doing, stopped shelling and we
covered the rest of the field in peace. Most of our
dead were in and around the pillbox that Tommy
Holmes took by bombing the machine-gun crew
which was outside and then getting another bomb
and putting it in the opening in the back; most
of the killing here was done from the pillbox on
Bellevue Spur over on the 43rd Battalion front
which commanded both fronts.
I was anxious to find Jaffray Eaton’s body
as I knew, from being told, almost exactly where
he was killed. Among the dead, many of whom I
assume were too far forward and were caught in
our own barrage, there were two small pieces of
board nailed together in the shape of a cross and
stuck in the ground in a shell-hole – the side of
which had apparently been shoveled to cover a
dead man – which we, of course, did not disturb.
However, when I visited the battlefield alone 15
months later just before we left for home, I saw
the little cross; the skull of the man covered up
there had been washed clean by the winter and
summer rains. I could not find an identity disk
but, from the round, somewhat odd-shaped teeth,
there was no doubt that it was my friend Jaffray,
after whom I named my eldest son.
On the way back, as we were passing over
Abraham Heights where, ten days earlier, we had
spent the night on the way into Passchendaele, the
Hun started to bracket us again, one shell in front
then one behind, another in front and so on. I was
walking on the duckboards in front of the Padre;
every time I heard one coming I would flatten
out on the duckboards and, looking up, would
see the Padre only pull his steel hat down on the
side on which he thought the shell was going to
drop. About the third time this happened I said,
“Padre, you must think I am shell-shocked.”
“Oh no, Tommy,” he said, “but I don’t think you
are a very good judge of distance and direction!”
It is not surprising that he was killed when his
throat was cut by a shell splinter at Amiens, and
no wonder every man in the Battalion mourned as
if he had lost an only brother. He was an Irishman
from the south of Ireland; a Protestant brought up
among Catholics which goes to make a tolerant
man and a Christian gentleman. As he had little
use for the Colonel – whose language and actions
were often most insulting and ungentlemanly –

the Padre spent much of his spare time with us
in “D” Company, roughnecks though we were.
When we got home that night, word had
come through that I was to report the next day
at the First Army School at Hardilow Plage for a
four-week course, while the rest of the Unit went
out on rest to be reinforced and reorganized.
It was a pleasant place near the Coast and on
the historic field of the Cloth of Gold. The only
incident of note, as far as I was concerned, was
that one Sunday morning, having missed a bus
in Boulogne the night before, I was up before the
Commandant for my first and only time in the
Army. I pleaded guilty without excuse and was
given a most unconventional punishment, that of
writing out in longhand ten pages of Field Service
Regulations Part I. I got back to the Battalion
before they went into the line again, to find
many new faces in my Platoon which, in spite of
considerable reorganization, was still No.15, the
best Platoon in the Regiment, commonly known
throughout the Unit as “The Hun Strafers.” I
had taken it over from Gregory Clark, MC, when
he was promoted to Captain and went to be
Adjutant. A hard man to follow.
*****

T

he Battle of Passchendaele – reputed to be
the most bloody of the War – was, in its
first and second and third phases, different
from many battles, in that it was fought under
extremely difficult conditions both as to weather
and ground. Despite history book figures with
respect to our front, our losses in killed and
wounded - and there were few survivors among
those seriously wounded – were at least five times
that of the Germans. Of course we made up the
difference in the number of prisoners taken. The
ground taken – about 50 acres for each Unit –
meant nothing. The Paris edition cf the Daily
Mail came out in the spring with a paragraph
as follows: “We have again compelled the Hun
to occupy the desolate waste of Passchendaele.”
Prior reconnaissance and maps indicating the
locations of the pillboxes were inadequate. If the
Germans had been smart and got out of their
pillboxes just as soon as the barrage had passed
instead of staying inside too long, in some cases
until we got there, there would have been as few
survivors everywhere as in front of Bellevue Spur.
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These are strange things to say now, but from
what I have said here of the happenings on our
own particular front I believe them to be only too
true, in the light of my subsequent experience.

Postscript

R

utherford’s description of the battlefield and
the effect that it had on the lead elements
of the attacking force highlight the inability of
the British and Canadian Staff to comprehend
the impact that the harrowing conditions
would have on the individual soldier and the
achievability of designated objectives.
The actions of the lead companies prior to
the battle are interesting. First, the onus for
intelligence gathering appears to have been
at the tactical level. Rutherford participated in
a standing patrol at “Wolf Farm” in the hours
preceding H-Hour but continued to seek to
define the German defensive layout right up to
the moment of jumping off. The platoon screens
deployed by both “C” and “D” Companies along
their respective frontages to the barrage line
denied German occupation of no-man’s-land
but gleaned little intelligence. Nevertheless, it
proved successful in countering the emerging
German doctrine of dispersing forces in
forward areas to break up attacks.7 The 4th
CMR history notes that unlike previous battles,
“the enemy’s line of defence was not a series
of uniform trenches to be taken and mopped
up” but rather “ isolated trenches and strongpoints dotted here and there.”8 The failure to
define the German defensive layout produced a
“threat centric” attack in which small groups of

men fought toward German pillboxes ignoring
company boundaries. This reality is illustrated
by Rutherford’s self-portrayal of isolation
throughout the battle. Very few references are
provided of his own platoon until the attack
succeeded and the 4th CMR consolidated on
the German position.
Another reason for the conduct of a series of
independent low-level actions rather than a
concentration of force may be rooted to the
unsatisfactory artillery support which made
coordinated fire and the maintenance of
momentum difficult. Lieutenant-Colonel W.R.
Patterson, the Commanding Officer of the 4th
CMR, considered the Canadian barrage “erratic
and not uniform.”9 In fact the barrage moved
only half as fast as it should have due to the
difficulty in keeping guns stable in the muddy
landscape.10 As a result of this instability, it
seems likely that Rutherford’s postulation that
initial friendly casualties were suffered as a
result of artillery rounds falling short is accurate.
He also alludes to the fact that members of “C”
Company, 4th CMR, who suffered the most
casualties from friendly artillery fire may have
been too far forward. Rutherford also suggests
the use of increased smoke and trench mortars
would have prevented many casualties.11
The battlefield conditions at Passchendaele also
appear to have impeded the re-supply of the
fighting soldiers and made the quick evacuation
of serious casualties difficult. Rutherford

Photo supplied by Jason Adair

From the start every Officer, NCO, and man was
on his own. There was no way to control such a
battle under such conditions. Our guns, stuck
as they were in the mud, were in no position to
fire a rolling barrage. If more mortars and smoke
bombs had been used, our casualties would
have been less than half what they were. Our
men were loaded down with equipment which
restricted their speed of movement which was
most essential. Fifty – yes, even half that number
– of good guerrilla-trained fighting men, properly
led, could have won our battle and taken as many
prisoners with very little loss.

Brigadier Tom Rutherford photographed
during the Second World War.
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noted the absence of water prior to and
during the battle with irony and commented,
“water, water everywhere but not a drop to
drink.” He also commented on the number of
seriously wounded men who died as a result
of their wounds. Interestingly, historian Daniel
Dancocks suggests that the chances of surviving
a wound were impressively good and lauds
the stretcher-bearers for their efforts.12 This
may have been attributable to the ability of
slightly wounded soldiers to prevent themselves
from drowning while seriously wounded men
floundered in the morass. Rutherford also notes
the effects of trench foot among his men after
the battle. The 4th CMR War Diary highlights
this problem and 29 men were evacuated after
the battle for this ailment.13
Rutherford suggests that 50 guerilla-trained
men could have accomplished the battalion’s
objectives. Prior to the war, Rutherford studied
in detail the actions of the Boer farmers against
the British in South Africa and thought this
type of warfare had great merit.14 He credits
the “ditching” of his cumbersome equipment
and the use of a rifle early in the battle as
essential to his survival and also alludes to the
displeasure of the Colonel when he learned of
this act.15 Also noteworthy is his observation
that most of the casualties at Bellevue Spur
were inflicted by rifle fire. His comment on the
number of German casualties as being five
times less than those suffered by the 4th CMR is
also surprising. Although the battalion captured
200 prisoners, they suffered 291 casualties
and Rutherford was the only officer in the lead
companies that was left unscathed.16
Rutherford continued to serve in the 4th
CMR until 25 August 1918 when he was
wounded by a German gas shell at Monchy-lePreux. Returning home in 1919, he remained
in the Non-Permanent Active Militia (NPAM)
throughout the interwar period, commanding
the Grey Regiment on two occasions and later
the 22nd Infantry Brigade. During the Second
World War, he commanded the Grey and Simcoe
Foresters and later the 1st Armoured Brigade
and the 11th Infantry Brigade. Considered too
old for fighting command, he was put in charge
of the Canadian Armoured Corps Reinforcement
Units in England until the end of the war. Upon
his return to Canada in 1946 he worked for

the Department of Veteran’s Affairs as Director
General Rehabilitation under LieutenantGeneral Tommy Burns. He lost a number of
friends at Passchendaele and returned to the
battlefield three times before his death in 1975.
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